[EM] Convex districts: a simple mathematical solution to gerrymandering?

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

From: abd at lomaxdesign.com
 >
 > Asset Voting cuts through this mess, wasting *no* votes except those
 > that are wasted, deliberately or through negligence, by candidates
 > receiving the votes, who refuse or are unable to combine excess votes
 > with those from other candidates to create winners. In other words,
 > there is someone specific who can be held accountable for the vote
 > wasting. I would think that generally, wasted votes under Asset would
 > be less than the quota for one winner. If it is a rule that one rep
 > may be elected with less than the quota, being the rep with the
 > highest vote after all the other winners are assigned, but not less
 > than a majority of them, the only likely wasted votes would be no
 > more than half the quota.
 
 Ok, that is just wrong. The Droop quota should be used for the quota.
 This means that all seats will require a full quota.
 
 It is not fair that the last representative elected gets in for only
 half the votes. It also creates an incentive to not make agreements
 early, as you might be wasting a vote that could be used for near
 double effect later on. In any case, I don't think giving half
 a quotas worth of voters a double strength vote is in any sense
 better than having a quota of wasted votes. The solution to both
 issues is to increase the number of seats per district. Otherwise,
 some form of distortion is unavoidable.
 
 It could end up in a chicken like process.
 
 Imagine there are 5 seats to fill and 6 candidates with approx a Droop
 quota of the votes each. None of them have hit the Hare quota, and
 unless one of them steps down, none of them get a seat. The 1 of them
 with less than the Droop quota isn't in any weaker a bargining position
 than the ones with a larger number of votes.
 
 If I was writing the law for asset voting, I would probably just say:
 
 "The candidates, equal in number to the number of seats to be filled,
 who possess the most votes, shall be given the option of transferring
 some of their votes to other candidates. After these votes have been
 transferred, the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated
 and that candidate shall be given the option of transferring any votes
 held to other candidates. This two step process shall be continued
 until the number of candidates remaining is equal to the number of
 seats to be filled."
 
 This eliminates any requirement to mention quotas. Also, it automatically
 results in the "quota" being rescaled if a candidate does not
 transfer his votes. Also, it doesn't allow a deadlock to occur.
 
 This ofc assumes that the candidates understand the maths behind
 the system (which they will likely learn *very* quickly).
 
 > Essentially, that last rep position becomes
 > a single-winner election. Given that we assume that Asset Voting is
 > public (the initial assignment of votes is standard secret ballot),
 > the last position would likely be a negotiated one among all those
 > candidates still holding unassigned votes.
 
 Not any more than it happens in a single winner district. The
 "negotiation" shall only involve trying to convince half a quotas
 worth of candidates to support you.
 
 > Asset Voting would, I expect, bring with it another major benefit. It
 > is really a secret ballot form of delegable proxy. Under Asset
 > Voting, and assuming that one may write in a candidate, voting
 > becomes a totally free choice, by the voter, of a representative, to
 > either fill the position, or to openly and publicly negotiate the
 > winners. Consider the effect of this on campaign financing....
 
 That is certainly a benefit and I agree with you that it could
 create an intermediate layer of representatives.
 
 What about adding to the above law:
 
 Any unelected candidate who, before any transfers occur, possesses 
 more than one tenth of the average number of votes held by the elected 
 candidates on election shall be deemed a part time representative and shall
 receieve compensation of one tenth the compensation received
 by the elected candidates.
 
 or something similar.
 
 > Imagine an assembly which is electing a council with N members at a
 > public meeting, and I'll assume that the full assembly size is Q * N.
 > The rule is that each member of the assembly gets one vote. Any group
 > of Q members of the assembly may combine their votes and create a
 > winner. This is a device for creating a proportional representation
 > council from a larger assembly. Asset Voting is not necessary for
 > this, with the assembly, because, I am assuming, the process is open,
 > not secret ballot. Asset Voting is necessary in order to accomplish a
 > similar purpose with secret ballot.
 
 This would be a good way to fill committees in Congress. (assuming
 Droop is used for the Quota).
 
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