<HTML><BODY>From: abd@lomaxdesign.com<br>
><br>
> Asset Voting cuts through this mess, wasting *no* votes except those<br>
> that are wasted, deliberately or through negligence, by candidates<br>
> receiving the votes, who refuse or are unable to combine excess votes<br>
> with those from other candidates to create winners. In other words,<br>
> there is someone specific who can be held accountable for the vote<br>
> wasting. I would think that generally, wasted votes under Asset would<br>
> be less than the quota for one winner. If it is a rule that one rep<br>
> may be elected with less than the quota, being the rep with the<br>
> highest vote after all the other winners are assigned, but not less<br>
> than a majority of them, the only likely wasted votes would be no<br>
> more than half the quota.<br>
<br>
Ok, that is just wrong. The Droop quota should be used for the quota.<br>
This means that all seats will require a full quota.<br>
<br>
It is not fair that the last representative elected gets in for only<br>
half the votes. It also creates an incentive to not make agreements<br>
early, as you might be wasting a vote that could be used for near<br>
double effect later on. In any case, I don't think giving half<br>
a quotas worth of voters a double strength vote is in any sense<br>
better than having a quota of wasted votes. The solution to both<br>
issues is to increase the number of seats per district. Otherwise,<br>
some form of distortion is unavoidable.<br>
<br>
It could end up in a chicken like process.<br>
<br>
Imagine there are 5 seats to fill and 6 candidates with approx a Droop<br>
quota of the votes each. None of them have hit the Hare quota, and<br>
unless one of them steps down, none of them get a seat. The 1 of them<br>
with less than the Droop quota isn't in any weaker a bargining position<br>
than the ones with a larger number of votes.<br>
<br>
If I was writing the law for asset voting, I would probably just say:<br>
<br>
"The candidates, equal in number to the number of seats to be filled,<br>
who possess the most votes, shall be given the option of transferring<br>
some of their votes to other candidates. After these votes have been<br>
transferred, the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated<br>
and that candidate shall be given the option of transferring any votes<br>
held to other candidates. This two step process shall be continued<br>
until the number of candidates remaining is equal to the number of<br>
seats to be filled."<br>
<br>
This eliminates any requirement to mention quotas. Also, it automatically<br>
results in the "quota" being rescaled if a candidate does not<br>
transfer his votes. Also, it doesn't allow a deadlock to occur.<br>
<br>
This ofc assumes that the candidates understand the maths behind<br>
the system (which they will likely learn *very* quickly).<br>
<br>
> Essentially, that last rep position becomes<br>
> a single-winner election. Given that we assume that Asset Voting is<br>
> public (the initial assignment of votes is standard secret ballot),<br>
> the last position would likely be a negotiated one among all those<br>
> candidates still holding unassigned votes.<br>
<br>
Not any more than it happens in a single winner district. The<br>
"negotiation" shall only involve trying to convince half a quotas<br>
worth of candidates to support you.<br>
<br>
> Asset Voting would, I expect, bring with it another major benefit. It<br>
> is really a secret ballot form of delegable proxy. Under Asset<br>
> Voting, and assuming that one may write in a candidate, voting<br>
> becomes a totally free choice, by the voter, of a representative, to<br>
> either fill the position, or to openly and publicly negotiate the<br>
> winners. Consider the effect of this on campaign financing....<br>
<br>
That is certainly a benefit and I agree with you that it could<br>
create an intermediate layer of representatives.<br>
<br>
What about adding to the above law:<br>
<br>
Any unelected candidate who, before any transfers occur, possesses <br>
more than one tenth of the average number of votes held by the elected <br>
candidates on election shall be deemed a part time representative and shall<br>
receieve compensation of one tenth the compensation received<br>
by the elected candidates.<br>
<br>
or something similar.<br>
<br>
> Imagine an assembly which is electing a council with N members at a<br>
> public meeting, and I'll assume that the full assembly size is Q * N.<br>
> The rule is that each member of the assembly gets one vote. Any group<br>
> of Q members of the assembly may combine their votes and create a<br>
> winner. This is a device for creating a proportional representation<br>
> council from a larger assembly. Asset Voting is not necessary for<br>
> this, with the assembly, because, I am assuming, the process is open,<br>
> not secret ballot. Asset Voting is necessary in order to accomplish a<br>
> similar purpose with secret ballot.<br>
<br>
This would be a good way to fill committees in Congress. (assuming<br>
Droop is used for the Quota).<br>
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