[EM] Addendum to condorcet method theory

[Dave Ketchum]

SOMETHING is missing here!

On Mon, 23 Oct 2006 23:23:27 -0700 (PDT) Antonio Oneala wrote:

First sentence is fine.

> I've been told in the past that the Condorcet method "wasn't meant to be 
> applied to proportional elections".  In it's original form it was not, 
> because Condorcet oversimplified it into two-way races.  However, if we 
> expand the definition to any perfect, strategy free race, then it would.
> 

But now we are in trouble:
      Select 1 winner from 2 candidates?  Sure, that is easy, but 
Plurality does that fine, so there is no reason to bother with Condorcet.
      Select 1 winner from x candidates - THIS is the challenge Condorcet 
solves, not caring how large x may be.
      Select n winners from n+1 candidates - THIS might not be much of a 
challenge, but a method restricted to this ability is not of interest.
      Select n winners from x candidates - THIS is the challenge a 
proportional election presents.

DWK


> In a single-seat election a perfect race would be between two 
> opponents.  If you vote for one you are definitely voting against the 
> other one and the worst of the two will always be eliminated.  In a 
> two-seat election, it follows, a perfect election would be between three 
> opponents.  Only the worst could be eliminated.  In  a three-seat it 
> would be a four opponent race, and etc... etc...
> 
> It seems to me that basing a proportional Condorcet method off of this 
> observation would allow any of the currently proposed single-winner 
> Condorcet methods to be easily extendend into the proportional realm, 
> simply be replacing two-way races in a single seat election with 
> three-way races in a two-seat election, and electing the two that were 
> unbeaten, or only beaten by each other.  Vote-splitting wouldn't happen 
> in such circumstances, so an STV-like transfer mechanism would be 
> unnecessary.
> 
> It seems a rather obvious assertation to make, and I wonder why so many 
> people have come up with some many ridiculously complicated schemes 
> whenever all you have to do is expand the definition of the method.
> 
> Just a simple observation... in all reality I believe the reweighted 
> range voting scheme is superior.

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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