[EM] Addendum to condorcet method theory

[Antonio Oneala]

I've been told in the past that the Condorcet method "wasn't meant to be applied to proportional elections".  In it's original form it was not, because Condorcet oversimplified it into two-way races.  However, if we expand the definition to any perfect, strategy free race, then it would.

In a single-seat election a perfect race would be between two opponents.  If you vote for one you are definitely voting against the other one and the worst of the two will always be eliminated.  In a two-seat election, it follows, a perfect election would be between three opponents.  Only the worst could be eliminated.  In  a three-seat it would be a four opponent race, and etc... etc...

It seems to me that basing a proportional Condorcet method off of this observation would allow any of the currently proposed single-winner Condorcet methods to be easily extendend into the proportional realm, simply be replacing two-way races in a single seat election with three-way races in a two-seat election, and electing the two that were unbeaten, or only beaten by each other.  Vote-splitting wouldn't happen in such circumstances, so an STV-like transfer mechanism would be unnecessary.

It seems a rather obvious assertation to make, and I wonder why so many people have come up with some many ridiculously complicated schemes whenever all you have to do is expand the definition of the method.

Just a simple observation... in all reality I believe the reweighted range voting scheme is superior.

 		
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