[EM] Addendum to condorcet method theory
David Cary
dcarysysb at yahoo.com
Tue Oct 24 05:35:02 PDT 2006
Besides its severely limited range of application, the other major
drawback of the proposed method is that it is not proportional.
To see this, take any 1-winner, 2 candidate election with a definite
winner. Clone the winner. Now you have a 2-winner, 3 candidate
election, where the two clones are the two weak Condorcet winners and
would be the two winners under the proposed plan. But those two
winners would exactly duplicate representation, not diversify it. In
such an election, it seems that any reasonable definition of
proportional representation would prefer instead picking one of the
clones and the non-clone candidate as winners.
-- David Cary
--- Antonio Oneala <watermark0n at yahoo.com> wrote:
> I've been told in the past that the Condorcet method "wasn't meant
> to be applied to proportional elections". In it's original form it
> was not, because Condorcet oversimplified it into two-way races.
> However, if we expand the definition to any perfect, strategy free
> race, then it would.
>
> In a single-seat election a perfect race would be between two
> opponents. If you vote for one you are definitely voting against
> the other one and the worst of the two will always be eliminated.
> In a two-seat election, it follows, a perfect election would be
> between three opponents. Only the worst could be eliminated. In
> a three-seat it would be a four opponent race, and etc... etc...
>
> It seems to me that basing a proportional Condorcet method off of
> this observation would allow any of the currently proposed
> single-winner Condorcet methods to be easily extendend into the
> proportional realm, simply be replacing two-way races in a single
> seat election with three-way races in a two-seat election, and
> electing the two that were unbeaten, or only beaten by each other.
> Vote-splitting wouldn't happen in such circumstances, so an
> STV-like transfer mechanism would be unnecessary.
>
> It seems a rather obvious assertation to make, and I wonder why so
> many people have come up with some many ridiculously complicated
> schemes whenever all you have to do is expand the definition of the
> method.
>
> Just a simple observation... in all reality I believe the
> reweighted range voting scheme is superior.
>
>
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