[EM] IFNOP Method (was Re: Question about Condorcet methods)

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

I wonder if this is sorta similar to a Borda count in terms of Clone independence.
 
 For example, if voters, A,B,C vote
 
 A: A>B>C1>C2
 B: B>C1>C2>A
 C: C1>C2>A>B
 
 A>B>C1>C2>A
 
 (Horizontal = first candidate)
 
 A>B
 0 0 0 1
 1 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0
 0 0 1 0
 
 B>C1
 0 0 0 0
 1 0 0 1 
 0 1 0 0
 0 0 0 0
 
 C1>C2
 0 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0 
 0 1 0 0
 0 0 1 0
 
 C2>A
 0 0 0 1
 0 0 0 0 
 0 1 0 0
 0 0 1 0
 
 The lowest ranked box is 4,4 and it is empty. The next lowest is (3,4) and (4,4)
 and only 3,4 has votes in it.
 
 C2>A, C1>C2 and A>B have pairs in that box. The only pair left is B>C1. 
 Thus, B wins?
 
 I am not 100% sure if I have understood you method correctly. However, by
 weighting lower preferences lower, the C "Party" has reduced the weighting
 of A>B in ballot C and C2>A in ballot B. Without the first one, the votes 
 become:
 
 A: A>B>C1>C2
 B: B>C1>C2>A
 C: C1>C2>A
 
 A=B
 A<C1
 A<C2
 
 B>C1
 B>C2
 
 C1>C2
 
 B draws to A and wins to C1 and C2.
 
 The effect seems to be opposite to Borda, cloning can result in your least favorite
 winning. That would likely lead to 2 party domination if cloning hurts a cause.
 
 Is your method equavalent (or very similar) to the following method.
 
 1) Voters rank N candidates
 2) M=N
 3) Ballots truncated to M rankings
  4) Condorcet winner is elected, if existing
 5) Otherwise, reduce M by 1 and goto 3)
 
 What about this instead
 
 1) Voters rank N candidates and include a range score
 2) M=N-1
 3) Ballots reduced to at most M clear preferences, least strong preferences equalised first
 4) Condorcet winner is elected, if existing
 5) Otherwise, reduce M by 1 and goto 3)
 
 
 Ok, so I could fill in the following ballot:
 
 A1: 1 (99) 
 A2: 2 (97)
 B: 3 (90)
 C1: 4 (0)
 C2: 5 (1)
 
 The voter messed up the ballot for C1 and C2 and also didn't rank E1 or E2.
 
 In effect, that preference will be equalised first due to the contradiction 
 (shown in bold below).
 
 So, my ballot would effectively be
 Round 1: A1>A2>B>C1>C2>E1=E2 (from ballot)
 Round 2: A1>A2>B>C1>C2>E1=E2 (already has 1 equality so no change required)
 Round 3: A1>A2>B>C1=C2>E1=E2 (-1 point difference between C1 and C2)
 Round 4: A1>A2>B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (1 point difference between C2 and '0')
 Round 5: A1=A2>B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (2 point difference between A1 and A2) 
 Round 6: A1=A2=B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (10 point difference between A2 and B2)
 Round 7: A1=A2=B=C1=C2=E1=E2 (90 point difference between B and C1)
 
 The preferences are converted to equalities in order of increasing difference.
 
 If round 7 happened, then the election has produced no winner. Maybe in such a 
 situation, switch to Range to decide the winner. I am not sure how rare it would 
 be though. 
 
 If two preferences have the same difference, then blank out the lower one first maybe. 
 Alternatively, blank out both (and thus none on the next round). In any case, a rule 
 needs to be applied.
 
 This system would be pretty complex though. Each district could produce a 
 digest, however, it will require N^3 boxes. Basically, they need to produce
 a standard condorcet digest for each round and there can be up to N-1 rounds. 
 Another option is that they produce only rounds 1-10 and only count more 
 rounds if necessary.
 
 It is more clone resistant than always using the lower ranked preferences. It
 allows voters to say who are the clones. If a voter thinks 2 candidates are
 clones, then they will rate them with the same score. This means they lose
 minimum expressivity. C1>C2 is almost as good as C1=C2 as they are clones
 and the voter will want to drop that preference before they drop their main
 preferences.
 
 
  Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com  
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