[EM] Suggested name for Range Voting: Free Voting

[Anthony O'Neal]

On 6/16/06, raphfrk at netscape.net <raphfrk at netscape.net> wrote:

Anthony O'Neal <thasupasacfitinman at gmail.com> write:

> > And about the proportional range system I talked about earlier, the
> workings
> > of the system is obvious. Under PAV rules, you assume that candidates
> give 1
> > point to an outcome for having one approved of candidate, 1/3 for the
> second
> > approved of candidate, 1/5 for the third, and so on, and so on.
>
>
>
> There are tactical issues with this method.  It is in your interests to
>
> not vote for someone who is already going to be elected.  It is also in
> the
> interests of a party to try to "vote manage".  If they can evenly split
> their
> vote, then they can get more candidates.
>
>
>
> One of the big benefits of STV/approval/range in the single seat case
> is not
> just that they elect a candidate better than plurality, it is that they
> allow
> better voter expression.  Even if someone loses an election, they could
> still be getting a better election/election share of the vote, keeping
> their
> supporters interested and also demonstrating to the incumbent a possible
> demographic to appeal to.
>
>
>
> Tactical voting works against that.  If people tactical vote, then they
> get
>
> no method to express their actual desired.
>
>

I don't think you understand the method.  It was a very short description,
but PAV is not vulnerable to tactical voting above what normal approval is.

Think of it like this.  In a multi-winner election, you don't approve of
candidates, you approve of outcomes.  In order to maintain proportionality,
however, you have to reduce peoples approval of an outcome by the St. Lague
or D'Hondt quota based on how many candidates are in the outcome that they
approve of.

>
> > Proportional range voting is simialar, except that it must occur in
> sets
> > (where the sets are the amount of points that may be given to each
> candidate
> > in the system). You add up the points 1 at a time, and whenever adding
> > another point completes a set, reduce the value of the next points the
> > person has given out by V / M * 2 + 1.
> >
> > So, here's an example of a rating that would be given to an outcome.
> >
> > This is an election for two seats, with four candidates.
> >
> > Range is 1-100
> >
> > voters ballot: A: 25, B: 125, C: 1, D: 75
>
>
>
> I assume that should be:
>
>
>
> A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75
>
>
>
> ?
>
>  You would be correct...



> Comparing this against outcome A, B:
> >
> > The voter gave out 125 points for A and B combined
> >
> > So the first 100 points count full strength for this outcome, and the
> next
> > 25 count 25/ 3, or 8.333...
> >
> > So the voter gives out 108.3333 points to this outcome.
>
>
>
> Another method that might be a good idea would be to limit the total
> number
> of points that can be given based on multiple candidates.
>
>
>
> For example, in PAV, the max I can cast is:
>
>
>
> 1:  1 vote
> 2:  1.3333 votes
> 3:  1.5333 votes
> 4:  1.6762 votes
>
>
>
> So switching to range, it would be limits:
>
>
>
> 1:  100
> 2:  133
> 3:  153
> 4:  168
>
>
>
> You would vote giving each candidate a score.  However, the above limits
> would be in effect based on how many candidates are being considered,
> so you
> don't overvote.
>
>
>
> In your election, a ballot of ( A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75 ) would
> become:
>
>
>
> AB: 100+25 = 125 => 125
> AC: 25+1   =  26 =>  26
> AD: 25+75  = 100 => 100
>
>
>
> BC: 100+1  = 101 => 101
> BD: 100+75 = 175 => 133 ( limited to 133 as 2 candidates )
>
>
>
> CD: 1+75   = 76  => 76
>
>
>
> In effect, your approval for an outcome is just the sum of your approval
> for each of the individual candidates elected.  However, there is a
> limit
> to prevent any one vote from becoming to strong.



If you reduce the strength of the vote for having multiple candidates
approved of it becomes cumulative vote, which is very vulnerable to tactical
voting.

The approval of outcomes method is probably the only way to overcome this.


This still collapses to PAV if all the voters vote 100 and 0 for every
> candidate.
>
>
>
> > Now, continue this process for all outcomes, then for all other
> voters,
> > sum the amount of points each voter gave to each outcome, and the
> outcome
> > with the most points wins.
>
>
>
> For larger elections, it would probably be better to use the sequential
> method.  Otherwise, there will be incentive to use computers for
> counting/
> recording the votes, which increases the potential for corruption of
> election officials.



The sequential  method is vulnerable to vote management and introduces
tactical voting into it.  It's also more vulnerable than a computer total
simply because people can just lie about the votes their getting as they're
hand-counting them.

For computer methods, the complexity doesn't matter.  It's just as easy to
make a program that hurts candidates of one party in STV as it is in PAV and
PRV.  And, actually, the only way to do STV elections without a randomness
is to use a computer.  The only real alternative to using complex methods
for proportionality is a party-list, which is undesirable because it
completely takes away candidate independence.
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