[EM] Suggested name for Range Voting: Free Voting

raphfrk at netscape.net raphfrk at netscape.net
Fri Jun 16 02:20:24 PDT 2006

Anthony O'Neal <thasupasacfitinman at gmail.com> write:
> And about the proportional range system I talked about earlier, the 
> of the system is obvious. Under PAV rules, you assume that candidates 
give 1
> point to an outcome for having one approved of candidate, 1/3 for the 
> approved of candidate, 1/5 for the third, and so on, and so on.

There are tactical issues with this method.  It is in your interests to
not vote for someone who is already going to be elected.  It is also in 
interests of a party to try to "vote manage".  If they can evenly split 
vote, then they can get more candidates.

One of the big benefits of STV/approval/range in the single seat case 
is not
just that they elect a candidate better than plurality, it is that they 
better voter expression.  Even if someone loses an election, they could
still be getting a better election/election share of the vote, keeping 
supporters interested and also demonstrating to the incumbent a possible
demographic to appeal to.

Tactical voting works against that.  If people tactical vote, then they 
no method to express their actual desired.

> Proportional range voting is simialar, except that it must occur in 
> (where the sets are the amount of points that may be given to each 
> in the system). You add up the points 1 at a time, and whenever adding
> another point completes a set, reduce the value of the next points the
> person has given out by V / M * 2 + 1.
> So, here's an example of a rating that would be given to an outcome.
> This is an election for two seats, with four candidates.
> Range is 1-100
> voters ballot: A: 25, B: 125, C: 1, D: 75

I assume that should be:

 A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75


> Comparing this against outcome A, B:
> The voter gave out 125 points for A and B combined
> So the first 100 points count full strength for this outcome, and the 
> 25 count 25/ 3, or 8.333...
> So the voter gives out 108.3333 points to this outcome.

Another method that might be a good idea would be to limit the total 
of points that can be given based on multiple candidates.

For example, in PAV, the max I can cast is:

1:  1 vote
2:  1.3333 votes
3:  1.5333 votes
4:  1.6762 votes

So switching to range, it would be limits:

1:  100
2:  133
3:  153
4:  168

You would vote giving each candidate a score.  However, the above limits
would be in effect based on how many candidates are being considered, 
so you
don't overvote.

In your election, a ballot of ( A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75 ) would 

AB: 100+25 = 125 => 125
AC: 25+1   =  26 =>  26
AD: 25+75  = 100 => 100

BC: 100+1  = 101 => 101
BD: 100+75 = 175 => 133 ( limited to 133 as 2 candidates )

CD: 1+75   = 76  => 76

In effect, your approval for an outcome is just the sum of your approval
for each of the individual candidates elected.  However, there is a 
to prevent any one vote from becoming to strong.

This still collapses to PAV if all the voters vote 100 and 0 for every 

> Now, continue this process for all outcomes, then for all other 
> sum the amount of points each voter gave to each outcome, and the 
> with the most points wins.

For larger elections, it would probably be better to use the sequential
method.  Otherwise, there will be incentive to use computers for 
recording the votes, which increases the potential for corruption of
election officials.

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