[EM] Suggested name for Range Voting: Free Voting
raphfrk at netscape.net
raphfrk at netscape.net
Fri Jun 16 15:49:51 PDT 2006
Anthony O'Neal <thasupasacfitinman at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Tactical voting works against that. If people tactical vote, then
they
> > get
> >
> > no method to express their actual desired.
> >
> >
>
> I don't think you understand the method. It was a very short
description,
> but PAV is not vulnerable to tactical voting above what normal
approval is.
>
> Think of it like this. In a multi-winner election, you don't approve
of
> candidates, you approve of outcomes. In order to maintain
proportionality,
> however, you have to reduce peoples approval of an outcome by the St.
Lague
> or D'Hondt quota based on how many candidates are in the outcome that
they
> approve of.
Hmm, are you sure about that ?
Assume that party A has 70% support and the party B has 30% support.
All voters are totally polarised and are only 2 seats
There are 3 candidates, A1, A2 and B1
Votes are:
70: A1: 100, A2: 100, B2: 0
30: A1: 0, A2: 0, B2: 100
Results:
A1, A2:
70: 100 + 100/3 => 133*70 = 9310
30: 0 => 30*0 = 0
Total: 9310
A1, B1:
70: 100 => 100*70 = 7000
30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000
Total: 10000
A2,B2
Same as A1,B1
Total: 10000
Result each party gets one seat (option 2 or 3 wins).
Now, party A decides to vote manage. They split the constituency into
2
halves. Each of the candidates only campaigns in one of the halves.
Voters are told to only vote for the candidate who campaigns for their
half of the constituency.
Votes become
37: A1: 100, A2: 0, B1: 0
33: A1: 0, A2: 100, B1: 0
30: A1: 0, A2: 0, B1: 100
Results:
A1,A2
37: 100 => 100*37 = 3700
33: 100 => 100*33 = 3300
30: 0 => 0*30 = 0
Total: 70000
A1, B1
37: 100 => 100*37 = 3700
33: 0 => 0*33 = 0
30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000
Total: 67000
A2,B2
37: 0 => 0*37 = 0
33: 100 => 100*33 = 3300
30: 100 => 100*30 = 3000
Total: 63000
Winner is option 1, A1,A2
Party A now wins 2 seats. They have benefited from vote management.
>> In effect, your approval for an outcome is just the sum of your
approval
>> for each of the individual candidates elected. However, there is a
>> limit
>> to prevent any one vote from becoming to strong.
>
>If you reduce the strength of the vote for having multiple candidates
>approved of it becomes cumulative vote, which is very vulnerable to
tactical
>voting.
Sorry, I meant limit the total voting power. This occurs anyway under
the system where there are divisors.
> The approval of outcomes method is probably the only way to overcome
this.
>
> The sequential method is vulnerable to vote management and introduces
> tactical voting into it.
The non-sequential method also suffers from tactical voting as I showed
above
(unless I made an error).
>It's also more vulnerable than a computer total
>simply because people can just lie about the votes their getting as
they're
>hand-counting them.
Ok, we have a fundamental disagreement here. In a hand count there
might
be some small amount of fraud/error. However, to really rig an
election,
you need to get lots of counters involved. Also, those counters are
observed. This makes it easier for there to be a small error but harder
for their to be a massive error.
A computer has a single point of failure (the program) and cannot be
readily observed. Also, the general public doesn't really understand
computers and those that do are often wary of using computers to do the
tally.
> For computer methods, the complexity doesn't matter. It's just as
easy to
> make a program that hurts candidates of one party in STV as it is in
PAV and
> PRV. And, actually, the only way to do STV elections without a
randomness
> is to use a computer. The only real alternative to using complex
methods
> for proportionality is a party-list, which is undesirable because it
> completely takes away candidate independence
You cannot do meeks method or some of the more advanced STV-PR by
hand however, it is possible to do fraction STV-PR by hand (look up
Gregory method).
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list