[EM] FBC comparison: WV, margins, MMPO, DMC

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Sep 8 14:11:59 PDT 2005


--- Jobst Heitzig <heitzig-j at web.de> a écrit :
> > Say your sincere ranking was A>B>cutoff>C.  Furthermore,
> > assume that your approval of B is important to maintaining the strength
> > of the B>C defeat.  
> What do you mean by this? That when you don't approve of B, C will win?

Yes. He means that if you do not approve B, the strength of the B>C win will
be inadequate to prevent C from winning.

> > If it was necessary to reduce the strength of the
> > A>B win, 
> And what does this mean? Why is it "necessary" to reduce it when you
> prefer A to B?

Because in the scenario, A can't win. So you are trying to reverse or weaken
the A>B pairwise win in order to move the win from C to B.

> > wouldn't the necessary strategic vote then become B>cutoff>A>C,
> > i.e. favorite betrayal?
> I don't understand this at all, sorry... could you post an example?

If you don't place B above the cutoff, then B>C is too weak to keep C from winning.
If you place A above the cutoff, then A>B is too strong to allow B to win.

If you have both of these pressures simultaneously, you are forced to rank
B strictly above A.

Kevin Venzke


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