[EM] favorite betrayal and 2-party domination
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Sep 8 07:58:00 PDT 2005
Thanks for the reminder. I try to be careful in writing about the FBC.
Or maybe I should write about any harm done to the favourite small
party candidate (which could lead to 2-party domination) in a more
general sense. In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
But I'm also not very worried since the real (stronger, meaningful)
reasons for 2-party domination are elsewhere, not in Condorcet or other
slightly big party favouring rules (e.g. d'Hondt method).
P.S. In range voting already voting A:100, B:90, C:0 would reduce the
chances of A to win.
> --- Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at luukku.com> a écrit :
>> On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting
>> preferences are A:100, B:80, C:0 and the voter strategically votes
>> A:100, B:100, C:0, isn't that also one type of favourite betrayal that
>> weakens the position of the (small party) candidate A? The Electowiki
>> definition of FBC talks about "voting someone over his favourite", but
>> in range voting already making the gap between A and B smaller has
>> influence (unlike in ranking based methods) and could be considered a
>> "betrayal". And giving less support to small parties could lead to
>> 2-party domination.
> There's a "strong" form of FBC in which it is betrayal even to rank
> candidate equal to your favorite.
> But I don't know of any deterministic method which satisfies strong
> This doesn't worry me much. If at least voters never need to rank
> *above* their favorites, this means voters can be at least as sincere
> as under
> Kevin Venzke
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