[EM] favorite betrayal and 2-party domination
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Thu Sep 8 12:14:56 PDT 2005
At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
>In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
>full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
>best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
It is interesting that this claim is made, not only by Mr. Laatu, but
also by Mr. Smith with respect to ordinary Approval.
I see no reason to anticipate that. The net effect, compared to the
present system, of Approval-style voting would seem to be to *equate*
small parties with large ones, because at present there is a great
deal of nose-holding least-of-two-evils voting. Approval will not
remove the need for that kind of consideration, *but* the additional
votes for third party candidates are *full* votes. In Range, there is
a dilemma: either weaken the vote which is likely to be effective, or
weaken the vote of the favorite not likely to win.
That full points are given to the small party candidate is, I think,
a pressure in the opposite direction from 2-party domination.
It has been claimed that Range Voting shows more support for
third-party candidates, based on the results of a poll conducted by
Mr. Smith. However "more support" in this case means that some third
party candidates were rated with a grade that would flunk them in
just about any class, but because it was greater numerically than the
vote percentage that they got under Plurality or Approval, it was
considered "greater support."
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