[EM] favorite betrayal and 2-party domination

[Kevin Venzke]

Juho,

--- Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at luukku.com> a écrit :
> On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting 
> preferences are A:100, B:80, C:0 and the voter strategically votes 
> A:100, B:100, C:0, isn't that also one type of favourite betrayal that 
> weakens the position of the (small party) candidate A? The Electowiki 
> definition of FBC talks about "voting someone over his favourite", but 
> in range voting already making the gap between A and B smaller has 
> influence (unlike in ranking based methods) and could be considered a 
> "betrayal". And giving less support to small parties could lead to 
> 2-party domination.

There's a "strong" form of FBC in which it is betrayal even to rank some
candidate equal to your favorite.

But I don't know of any deterministic method which satisfies strong FBC.

This doesn't worry me much. If at least voters never need to rank compromises
*above* their favorites, this means voters can be at least as sincere as under 
Approval.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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