[EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
andru at cs.cornell.edu
Sat Sep 3 12:15:43 PDT 2005
On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 12:58:05PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
> Hi All,
> What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
> claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
> no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
> BR, Juho
Thanks to Rob and Juho for correcting me. I would like to have a statement
about strategic immunity that doesn't rely on people judging the difficulty of
creating a top cycle. Presumably creating a top cycle would require a number
of (effectively coordinated) insincere votes that is greater than half the
margin of the weakest sincere preference for the CW?
Is there any stronger statement that can be made for strategic immunity
of specific completion methods, ideally ones that satisfy the summability
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