[EM] alternative Smith?

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Mon Oct 31 19:37:15 PST 2005


James, Participants,

I'm sorry I've been impulsively posting without enough thought and so 
have to keep
correcting myself.

James Green-Armytage wrote: 

> Anyway, Nicolaus Tideman called me this afternoon to tentatively
> recommend a mixture of the Smith rule and the IRV rule:
> 1. Eliminate non-members of the Smith set.
> 2. If >1 candidate remains, eliminate the plurality loser.
> 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until one candidate remains. 

I stupidly responded:

> The method Tideman  suggests is Smith//IRV.

As I suspected soon after I sent that off and has been pointed out to me 
off-list, that isn't quite
right.

>No, I don't think it is.  That would be to repeat step 2 (only) until
>one candidate remains.  With rule 3 as it stands, you recalculate
>the Smith set for the remaining candidates and eliminate any
>non-members.  I can't think of a comma alternative to this.
>
But the quoted Tideman suggestion gives the same results as Smith//IRV 
in that demonstration by
Douglas Woodall that I quoted, so it does fail  Mono-add-Plump and 
Mono-append.

In my most recent post  I suggested  "MDD,Smith,IRV":

> "Unless all the candidates have majority-strength defeats, disqualify 
> from winning all those that do.
> Also disqualify from winning candidates who are not members of the 
> Smith set.
> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest-ordered by  IRV on 
> the original ballots." 

I  went on to say that the only disadvantage that I could see that this 
has versus plain Smith,IRV is that
it fails  Independence from Irrelevant Ballots.

Kevin Venzke has pointed out another:

>MDD inherently fails Clone-Winner.
>

Chris  Benham






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