[EM] alternative Smith?
Chris Benham
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Mon Oct 31 19:37:15 PST 2005
James, Participants,
I'm sorry I've been impulsively posting without enough thought and so
have to keep
correcting myself.
James Green-Armytage wrote:
> Anyway, Nicolaus Tideman called me this afternoon to tentatively
> recommend a mixture of the Smith rule and the IRV rule:
> 1. Eliminate non-members of the Smith set.
> 2. If >1 candidate remains, eliminate the plurality loser.
> 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until one candidate remains.
I stupidly responded:
> The method Tideman suggests is Smith//IRV.
As I suspected soon after I sent that off and has been pointed out to me
off-list, that isn't quite
right.
>No, I don't think it is. That would be to repeat step 2 (only) until
>one candidate remains. With rule 3 as it stands, you recalculate
>the Smith set for the remaining candidates and eliminate any
>non-members. I can't think of a comma alternative to this.
>
But the quoted Tideman suggestion gives the same results as Smith//IRV
in that demonstration by
Douglas Woodall that I quoted, so it does fail Mono-add-Plump and
Mono-append.
In my most recent post I suggested "MDD,Smith,IRV":
> "Unless all the candidates have majority-strength defeats, disqualify
> from winning all those that do.
> Also disqualify from winning candidates who are not members of the
> Smith set.
> Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest-ordered by IRV on
> the original ballots."
I went on to say that the only disadvantage that I could see that this
has versus plain Smith,IRV is that
it fails Independence from Irrelevant Ballots.
Kevin Venzke has pointed out another:
>MDD inherently fails Clone-Winner.
>
Chris Benham
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