[EM] Sincere methods

[Andrew Myers]

On Wed, Mar 23, 2005 at 06:50:26PM +0100, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Andrew and Juho!
> 
> You seem to agree that...
> > ...if votes are sincere, the best voting method would
> > not be Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a
> > number of points to each candidate representing the utility they
> > ascribe to that candidate. The candidate with the largest total
> > utility would win. This method has obvious advantages over Condorcet:
> > it is simpler and takes advantage of more information from the
> > voters. Of course, it is trivially vulnerable to insincere voters.
> 
> My position on this question is: Such a method would not only be
> vulnerable to insincere voters, it would invite them!

If the utilities aren't bounded, I'd certainly agree. But if the utilities
(ratings) are bounded (say, between 0 and 1), then don't you have a mostly
harmless generalization of approval?

-- Andrew