[EM] Re: Total Approval Ranked Pairs

[Forest Simmons]

On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Ted Stern wrote:

>
>>
>> Furthermore, the set P of all candidates none of which is beaten by any
>> candidate with greater approval turns out to be the set of candidates that
>> are as high or higher than the approval winner in the sorted order.
>>
>
> Seems nice, but why is this a nice property to have?  Is there something
> special about it?
>

I recently suggested that the winner should be picked from this set P by 
random ballot.

This set P always includes the AW and the CW (when there is one), and in 
general some other relatively high approval candidates that are good at 
winning pairwise contests.

This set P is much more restrictive than the set Q of all candidates with 
beat paths to the AW, which I once proposed.


But I think P may be adequate to control most insincere voting, though it 
doesn't do as well as Q on the notorious

49 C
24 B>>A>C
27 A>B>>C

example.

For this example, using Jobst's Random Approval Ballot Order as the seed 
for bubble sort, and then picking (by random ballot) from the candidates 
that end up as high or higher than the AW, might do the job of 
discouraging truncation.


In any case this set P is independent from pareto dominated alternatives.


Forest