[EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Compromise

[Ted Stern]

On 9 Mar 2005 at 10:29 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is 
> more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same 
> candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is 
> no CW available.
>
> That seems to me like a kind of one sided approach to "compromise."

Well, if one is a Condorcet advocate, one might view Approval as means toward
the end (intuitively appealing cycle resolution), and not necessarily as an
equally valid end.

>
> A less biased approach that puts these two on an equal footing should 
> respect the following principle:
>
> Both the CW and the Approval Winner should have reasonable chances of
> winning.

That's a very big philosophical step to take!  Sort of on a par with the
difference between approval and ranked ballots, don't you think?

>
> Here's my current favorite among such methods:
>
> Use random ballot among candidates that have beat paths to the Approval
> Winner.

... including the Approval Winner (sorry for stating the obvious).

Might be useful for smaller elections.

Respectfully yours,

Ted
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