[EM] Approval/Condorcet Compromise

Forest Simmons simmonfo at up.edu
Wed Mar 9 10:29:46 PST 2005


Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is 
more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same 
candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is 
no CW available.

That seems to me like a kind of one sided approach to "compromise."

A less biased approach that puts these two on an equal footing should 
respect the following principle:


Both the CW and the Approval Winner should have reasonable chances of 
winning.

Here's my current favorite among such methods:

Use random ballot among candidates that have beat paths to the Approval 
Winner.

Forest






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