[EM] Condorcet-Approval hybrid method

[Kevin Venzke]

Russ,

 --- Russ Paielli <6049awj02 at sneakemail.com> a écrit : 
> Why not combine Condorcet and Approval into a hybrid election method? 
> The voter ranks the candidates, but truncates at his approval cutoff 
> point. If a Condorcet winner exists he wins, otherwise the winner is 
> determined from the Smith set using Approval rules, where ranked 
> candidates and considered approved and unranked candidates are 
> considered unapproved.
> 
> I would tend to oppose allowing equal rankings (except for implied equal 
> rankings for the unranked candidates, of course).

I don't know why you want to disallow equal rankings. Just to make the
count somewhat easier? If you use Approval, you're not using any defeat
strength measure, so the WV vs. Margins question doesn't exist.

> How would this method stack up? What would the voting strategy look 
> like? And has it been proposed before? If so, when and where? Thanks.

I think it has been proposed many, many times. I don't know when, but I would
try a search for "Condorcet-Approval hybrid."

I like the method, though, especially with a three-slot ballot. Would-be 
offensive strategists cannot bury a candidate without giving much approval, 
possibly enough to win, to the minor candidates under which they bury their 
opponent.

But if you feel Condorcet already has too much truncation incentive, then
using Approval as a cycle-breaker will just make things worse.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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