[EM] No, that isn´t SFC either. Endless guessing games?

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Mike!

you wrote:
> Here´s the actual definition of SFC:
> 
> SFC:
> 
> If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
> candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn´t win.
> 
> [end of SFC definition]
> 
> Which part of that don´t you undestand?

Well, I at least think I understand it, assuming you speak of the
*sincere* CW (otherwise, that is, if you meant CW according to the cast
prefernces, then each Condorcet method would fulfil SFC trivially by
definition, and that cannot be what you meant).

But: Can you tell me just one method which passes that criterion?

Approval certainly doesn't: If the sincere preferences are
  2  X>Y, both approved
  1  Y>X, only Y approved
and all three vote sincerely, then (a) no one falsifies a preference,
(b) a majority prefers the CW (X) to Y, (c) that majority votes
sincerely, but of course Y still wins.

So, although I find anti-strategy criteria most important and are
completely d'accord with you that their formulation will of course
contain references to the sincere preferences of the voters, I still
don't think that this particular criterion, at least not in the above
version, is particularly useful...

Yours, Jobst