[EM] Markus, 16 March, '05, 0650 GMT

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Markus--

You said:

Well, you wrote that a candidate B is "majority rejected"
when there is another candidate A such that a majority of
the voters strictly prefers candidate A to candidate B.

I reply:

No, that wasn't how I defined "majority-rejected". I spoke of voting, not 
preference.

You continued:

You wrote that the used election method shouldn't
unnecessarily elect a "majority rejected" candidate. This
criterion led to election methods like MinMax(winning votes)
or RMDD.

I reply:

Not quite. The criterion that led to RMDD didn't contain the word 
"unnecessarily".
When I defined RMDD, last summer, I was looking for a method that met the 
following criterion:

If a majority of the voters prefer X to Y and vote sincerely, then Y 
shouldn't win.

So the criterion that led to RMDD was actually quite different from the one 
that you mis-stated above. As I said, that would be a desirable criterion if 
it could be met without too high a price. But that criterion, the strongest 
majority defensive strategy criterion, can only be met by a significant 
sacrifice of decisiveness.

You continued:

But it cannot be said that with this criterion
you "proposed wv as a general class of methods".

I reply:

Of course not, and I'm not claiming that I proposed wv with that criterion. 
I proposed wv years before I defined GMC. I justified wv in terms of its 
strategy advantages, as measured by criteria that, as I said, were early 
versionis of SFC, WDSC, and SDSC.

Mike Ossipoff

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