[EM] Re: minmax is not a good public election method

Russ Paielli 6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Tue Jun 21 00:05:32 PDT 2005

Kevin Venzke stepjak-at-yahoo.fr |EMlist| wrote:

>>>Smith//Approval and DMC behave more like WV than margins, by the way, so
>>>it doesn't seem to me that they have "dodged the issue." WV and Approval
>>>both consider the literal number of voters in favor of some position.


In Approval, each voter either approves or disapproves each candidate, 
and the approved and disapproved counts for each candidate add up to the 
total number of voters. That is also exactly what would happen if 
"abstentions" in pairwise races were counted as half a vote for each 
candidate. Therefore I contend that Approval resembles margins as much 
or more than wv.

>>I don't know how it "behaves," but the fact is that Smith/Approval does 
>>not need to determine margins or winning votes. It simply doesn't come 
>>up. Each pairwise race is essentially binary (ternary if you count the 
>>possibility of a tie).
> I don't understand why this fact is interesting. Is it because there's no
> potential for an argument over it? Presumably someone who dislikes WV and
> likes margins will have enough sense to determine that S//A and DMC aren't
> what he wants.

Let me repeat: I am not advocating margins over winning votes. I am 
advocating neither. I am saying that any method that depends on the 
distinction in some fundamental way is fundamentally flawed.


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