[EM] The Sincere Optimality for Acceptable Candidates Criterion
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Jun 14 21:46:38 PDT 2005
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :
> The Sincere Optimality for Acceptable Candidates Criterion (SOACC):
> If, for some particular voter, the election is an acceptable/unacceptable
> situation, then that voter should be able to get his/her best outcome while
> voting all of his/her preferences among the acceptable candidates.
> For a particular voter, and a particular configuration of other people's
> votes, that voter's best outcome is an outcome such that, given that
> configuration of other people's votes, the voter couldn't gain an outcome
> that s/he likes better than that outcome.
> [end of SOACC definition]
> MMPO with AERLO meets SOACC, as well as Strong FBC.
> tMMWV and other FBC complying methods meet Strong FBC, with AERLO. They too
> might meet SOACC.
> Why discuss acceptable/unacceptable strategy? Because, for one thing, I
> claim that an acceptable/unacceptable situation exists in our public
> elections. But, aside from that, it's a plausible assumption that greatly
> simplifies strategy. We here haven't thoroughly gone into general rank
> strategy for rank-balloting methods. But the acceptable/unacceptable
> situation is one about which definite strategy statements can be made.
I agree that this is useful to consider, especially as even the most
sophisticated pairwise methods don't entirely free the voter from approval-
style considerations (e.g., where to equal rank, where to rank even at
I doubt that SOACC can be satisfied. Actually, I doubt that even strong
FBC can be satisfied, since who you rank in first place can affect which
other voters' AERLOptions are "activated." What if they, in general, don't
favor the same candidates as you? If you cause them to get to use AERLO, it
might cause a worse result for yourself.
It's just a thought.
Maybe a SOACC-like criterion can be weakened, so that rather than ensuring
that the voter gets the "best" outcome, it just ensures that if the voter can
elect a candidate in set X (i.e., the acceptable candidates) using one strict
ranking of those candidates, he can get a candidate from X using any strict
ranking of them (but not necessarily the same one, or one liked as much).
You'd also want to say that lowering a member of X to unacceptable status
can't cause a member of X to be elected if some member wasn't already. That
would be implied by FBC, I think.
I'm not sure if this version can be satisfied, either, but it's interesting.
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