[EM] The Sincere Optimality for Acceptable Candidates Criterion
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Jun 14 21:10:13 PDT 2005
When I described the acceptable/unacceptable strategy of MMPO with AERLO,
that suggests that MMPO with AERLO mets something that is, in some ways,
stronger than Strong FBC. It has occurred to me that a criterion should be
written to describe that advantage, and that's the purpose of this posting.
First, let me make my acceptable/unacceptable definition more explicit,
since I need it for a criterion:
For a particular voter, an acceptable/unacceptable situation exists if, for
that voter, all the candidates are in 2 sets such that that voter would
rather try to ensure that the winner will come from a particular one of
those sets than try to influence which member of one of the sets will win
instead of some other member of that same set. The set that he wants the
winner to come from is the "acceptable" set for that voter, and the other
set is the "unacceptable" set. Their members are, respectively, the
acceptable candidates and the unacceptable candidates.
[end of acceptable/unacceptable situation definition]
Maybe it could be better worded, but that will do for now.
The Sincere Optimality for Acceptable Candidates Criterion (SOACC):
If, for some particular voter, the election is an acceptable/unacceptable
situation, then that voter should be able to get his/her best outcome while
voting all of his/her preferences among the acceptable candidates.
For a particular voter, and a particular configuration of other people's
votes, that voter's best outcome is an outcome such that, given that
configuration of other people's votes, the voter couldn't gain an outcome
that s/he likes better than that outcome.
[end of SOACC definition]
MMPO with AERLO meets SOACC, as well as Strong FBC.
tMMWV and other FBC complying methods meet Strong FBC, with AERLO. They too
might meet SOACC.
Why discuss acceptable/unacceptable strategy? Because, for one thing, I
claim that an acceptable/unacceptable situation exists in our public
elections. But, aside from that, it's a plausible assumption that greatly
simplifies strategy. We here haven't thoroughly gone into general rank
strategy for rank-balloting methods. But the acceptable/unacceptable
situation is one about which definite strategy statements can be made.
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