[EM] Fall Back Approval

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Jun 3 19:42:27 PDT 2005


--- "Simmons, Forest " <simmonfo at up.edu> a écrit :
> In the first round only the alternatives ranked first (or equal first) are counted as approved,
> i.e. a tentative cutoff is placed immediately below the top rank on each ballot.
> In subsequent rounds the tentative cutoff is moved down one rank on all ballots for which the
> current tentative approval winner lies more than one rank below the current tentative cutoff.
> When all tentative cutoffs cease to move, the current approval winner is declared winner of the
> election.
> [End of Method Definition]
> Is this method monotonic?
> Does it satisfy the FBC?

I'm sure it lacks both. When a ballot approves a candidate (either initially or
in response to a current leader), there is no guarantee that it will be purely
helpful, since other ballots can "react" to it.

This is similar to a method I suggested some time ago. I think the only
difference is that in my method, *all* ranks above the current approval winner
became approved. (Possibly I only suggested a three-slot version.)

These "repeated rounds" methods (including, say, GIA) can't be monotonic, since
they don't use information monotonically. (Kind of a silly thing to say, but
it's an intuitive litmus test.)

Kevin Venzke


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