[EM] Miscellaneous MMPO & MDDA comments.

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sun Jun 26 22:27:55 PDT 2005

These judgements are just my own opinion.

Why I wouldn't trade SFC for ICC:

Premise requirements, from the voter's point of view:

SFC applies to you if you're in a majority of voters who prefer the CW to 
someone, Y, whom you want to keep from winning, and if no one falsifies a 
preference (or at least if the number doing so isn't great enough to change 
the election outcome).

ICC applies only if everyone votes sincerely, which, in a rank method, means 
that everyone ranks all of the candidates.

SFC's applicability requirements sound more plausible.


SFC guarantees that you won't have to do other than rank sincerely, in order 
to make Y lose.

ICC guarantees that your faction can run as many or as few identical 
candidates as they want to, without affecting their faction's chances.

SFC's guarantee appeals to me more.

But both criteria depend, for their applicability to a situation, on facts 
beyond the individual voter, facts that might not be knowable to the voter.

I don't object to trading SFC compliance for compliance with a better 
criterion.  In interested in how much better a method can be devised by such 
trades. The only criterion that I wouldn't be willing to trade away is FBC.

Now I understand what Kevin meant when he objected to the difficulty of 
applying FBC. The votes-only FBC that we've been discussing is definitely 
more easily applied.

It seems to me that there was reason to believe that they're equivalent for 
monotonic methods, but I don't want to say that for sure.

For use with the public, of course the preference FBC, the original version, 
is useful, because it's so oibvious, intuitive and briefly-stated. For 
actually testing methods, the votes-only FBC is more useful.

The votes-only FBC seems to be the top-end counterpart to LNHarm and LNHelp. 
Probably the only attainable top end counterpart to those criteria. But if 
they have other attainable top-end counterparts, that would be an 
interesting and important thing to find out.

So, in that way, votes-only FBC fits into a larger system of criteria.

CR, MMPO, and MDDA are all equivalent to Approval in an 
acceptable/unacceptable situation when the voter votes optimally (with power 
truncation available in MMPO & MDDA). Is that a general fact, that all 
FBC-complying methods are equivalent to Approval under those conditions, or 
are there exceptions?

Though I'd like to keep SFC, and the freedom to vote all preferences, the 
3-slot limitation would be acceptable if it can bring compliance with a more 
important criterion.

Kevin spoke of replacing disqualification with something more sophisticated. 
I hope that wouldn't mean more complicated, because that would spoil it as a 
public proposal. The beauty of Approval, CR, MMPO and MDDA is their 
simplicity, in addition to their FBC compliance.

Mike Ossipoff

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