[EM] Information needed to apply WDSC & SDSC

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Jan 17 09:18:08 PST 2005


Kevin--

You wrote:

These are Mike Ossipoff's SDSC and WDSC. I prefer the wording I
used since it can be applied even when sincere preferences are unknown.)

  I reply:

  No one's actual preferences need to be known in order to apply WDSC and 
SDSC. For instance, I've demonstrated here that IRV fails both of those 
criteria, and that Approval & Condorcet meet WDSC, and that the better 
Condorcet methods meet SDSC--without making any use of information about the 
preferences of anyone.

  Yes, my defensive strategy criteria refer to preferences, but the writer 
of a failure example can specify preferences as he chooses, as can the 
writer of a compliance demonstration. No knowledge of the actual preferences 
of any actual person is needed.

  With Approval, a majority who prefer X to Y can make Y lose without 
reversing a preference. That's desirable.  And no one ever has incentive to 
vote someone over their favorite. That's desirable too.

I welcome other criteria too, including any by you that accomplish something 
similar to WDSC & SDSC without mentioning preference.

Mike Ossipoff

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