[EM] Criteria

[Jim & Mary Ronback]

For us newcomers, I suggest that Mike and Russ co-author a joint paper 
and provide operational definitions of voter strategies (based on 
observing voter behaviour), plus criteria, terms and methods, using a an 
easy to read programming language, e.g., Modula 3 or Spark Ada, and Mark 
act as the editor. What do you think?

Cheers,
Jim
in sunny Tsawwassen, BC

Russ Paielli wrote:

> MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
>
>>
>> Russ said:
>>
>> Some of those criteria were Mike-style criteria and some were normal
>> criteria. However, looking back at it, I see that we had the Condorcet
>> criteria defined in terms of true preferences, with the stipulation that
>> the voters voted "sincerely." Stipulating that the voters vote sincerely
>> simply eliminates the voting strategy and essentially converts a
>> Mike-style criterion to a normal criterion.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> No, the Condorcet's Criterion that was at the website at the 
>> technical evaluation page was a Mike style criterioni entirely. It 
>> referred to the CW (which you called the IDW, defined as I define the 
>> CW), and it stipulated sincere voting. Both the CW and sincere voting 
>> are defined by me in terms of preference, and were defined at your 
>> website in terms of preference.
>
>
> If you stipulate "sincere" voting, then you are eliminating the voting 
> strategy and stipulating that the actual votes cast are identical to 
> the "sincere" or true preferences. In that case, a Mike-style 
> criterion is equivalent to a standard tally-rules-based criterion.
>
> You can take any standard criterion, play this trick, and call it a 
> Mike-style criterion. You will only be obfuscating the issue and 
> adding nothing of any value, however. That's exactly what we did with 
> the old Condorcet criterion on our former website, and looking back at 
> it, I realize it was an embarrassment. The Condorcet criterion can and 
> should be defined in terms of actual votes only.
>
>> Russ continues:
>>
>> But it involves an
>> unnecessary step that only confuses the matter. In other words, we had a
>> normal criterion bollocksed up to make it look superficially like a
>> Mike-style criterion.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> No, that Condoret's Criterion was thoroughly a Mike style criterion, 
>> for the reasons stated above.
>
>
> Then "that" Condoret's Criterion wasn't the standard Condorcet 
> criterion. I could just as well define my own version of monotonicity 
> too, but what would it accomplish other than making me look like a fool?
>
> <cut>
>
>> Russ continues:
>>
>> Take SFC, the "Strategy-Free Criterion":
>>
>> "If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a majority
>> prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate should
>> not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
>> any preferences."
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> That's your wording, corrected by me so that it retains the meaning 
>> that I intended. But let me state it my way:
>>
>> If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to 
>> candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
>
>
> Actually, I think Approval passes this criterion. If that majority 
> draw their cutoff between X and Y, then Y can't win.
>
> I realize that some criteria are defined for ranking methods only, but 
> I clearly recall that Mike intended for his criteria to apply to all 
> methods (as implied by the compliance table at the top of the old 
> "Technical Evaluation" page).
>
> The question is then whether rating candidates equally in Approval 
> constitutes a "sincere" vote when the voter doesn't really consider 
> them equal. If not, that needs to explicitly specified as part of the 
> criterion definition, because it is certainly *not* obvious. Since 
> that was not explicitly stated, I say Approval passes SFC as stated 
> above.
>
> <cut>
>
>> Russ continues:
>>
>> Now, what does this
>> Mike-style criterion tell us? It tells us that a majority can use a
>> strategy to thwart a minority.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> We're finding out that Russ hadn't a clue about the meaning of the 
>> criteria that were at his website.
>>
>> Provided that no one falsifies a preference,
>> B loses without the CW>B voters doing other than voting sincerely. I 
>> don't call that a use of strategy by the CW>B voters. The point of 
>> the criterion is that, with complying methods, under the criterion's 
>> premise conditions, that majority needn't do other than vote 
>> sincerely, to make Y lose.
>>
>> Russ continues:
>>
>> So why, then, is it called the
>> "Strategy-Free" criterion? It is called that because the strategy
>> doesn't require any reversal of true preferences. But it *does* involve
>> insincere truncation strategy
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> Not at all. Russ just stated the criterion, and it didn't say that 
>> the  members of that majority could keep Y from winning if that 
>> majority truncated. It said that if no one falsifies a preference, 
>> and if the majority who prefer the CW to Y vote sincerely, then Y 
>> won't win, with a complying method. The CW>Y voters needn't do other 
>> than rank sincerely. That's why it's called the Strategy-Free criterion.
>
>
> Actually, Mike is right about that. I just re-read the criterion, and 
> it doesn't involve truncation by the majority. I guess that justifies 
> the insults, eh?
>
> Maybe Mike will wake up some day and realize that he started the 
> insults, and he perpetuates them. I will be happy to stop insulting 
> Mike as soon as he stops insulting me and learns how to disagree 
> respectfully. Until that time (or until I get off this email list), I 
> will continue to expose him as the pedantic amateur he is. He badly 
> needs to learn a lesson about professionalism even if he is an amateur.
>
>> Russ continues:
>>
>> , which the criterion itself does not
>> state. So the criterion name itself is misleading.
>>
>> I replyi:
>>
>> Russ has mislead himself by being unable to read what he's just copied.
>
>
> Another insult.
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