[EM] Russ, Criteria that mention preference

[Russ Paielli]

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
> 
> Russ said:
>
> Some of those criteria were Mike-style criteria and some were normal
> criteria. However, looking back at it, I see that we had the Condorcet
> criteria defined in terms of true preferences, with the stipulation that
> the voters voted "sincerely." Stipulating that the voters vote sincerely
> simply eliminates the voting strategy and essentially converts a
> Mike-style criterion to a normal criterion.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No, the Condorcet's Criterion that was at the website at the technical 
> evaluation page was a Mike style criterioni entirely. It referred to the 
> CW (which you called the IDW, defined as I define the CW), and it 
> stipulated sincere voting. Both the CW and sincere voting are defined by 
> me in terms of preference, and were defined at your website in terms of 
> preference.

If you stipulate "sincere" voting, then you are eliminating the voting 
strategy and stipulating that the actual votes cast are identical to the 
"sincere" or true preferences. In that case, a Mike-style criterion is 
equivalent to a standard tally-rules-based criterion.

You can take any standard criterion, play this trick, and call it a 
Mike-style criterion. You will only be obfuscating the issue and adding 
nothing of any value, however. That's exactly what we did with the old 
Condorcet criterion on our former website, and looking back at it, I 
realize it was an embarrassment. The Condorcet criterion can and should 
be defined in terms of actual votes only.

> Russ continues:
> 
> But it involves an
> unnecessary step that only confuses the matter. In other words, we had a
> normal criterion bollocksed up to make it look superficially like a
> Mike-style criterion.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No, that Condoret's Criterion was thoroughly a Mike style criterion, for 
> the reasons stated above.

Then "that" Condoret's Criterion wasn't the standard Condorcet 
criterion. I could just as well define my own version of monotonicity 
too, but what would it accomplish other than making me look like a fool?

<cut>

> Russ continues:
> 
> Take SFC, the "Strategy-Free Criterion":
> 
> "If an Ideal Democratic Winner (IDW) exists, and if a majority
> prefers the IDW to another candidate, then the other candidate should
> not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
> any preferences."
> 
> I reply:
> 
> That's your wording, corrected by me so that it retains the meaning that 
> I intended. But let me state it my way:
> 
> If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to 
> candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.

Actually, I think Approval passes this criterion. If that majority draw 
their cutoff between X and Y, then Y can't win.

I realize that some criteria are defined for ranking methods only, but I 
clearly recall that Mike intended for his criteria to apply to all 
methods (as implied by the compliance table at the top of the old 
"Technical Evaluation" page).

The question is then whether rating candidates equally in Approval 
constitutes a "sincere" vote when the voter doesn't really consider them 
equal. If not, that needs to explicitly specified as part of the 
criterion definition, because it is certainly *not* obvious. Since that 
was not explicitly stated, I say Approval passes SFC as stated above.

<cut>

> Russ continues:
> 
> Now, what does this
> Mike-style criterion tell us? It tells us that a majority can use a
> strategy to thwart a minority.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> We're finding out that Russ hadn't a clue about the meaning of the 
> criteria that were at his website.
> 
> Provided that no one falsifies a preference,
> B loses without the CW>B voters doing other than voting sincerely. I 
> don't call that a use of strategy by the CW>B voters. The point of the 
> criterion is that, with complying methods, under the criterion's premise 
> conditions, that majority needn't do other than vote sincerely, to make 
> Y lose.
> 
> Russ continues:
> 
> So why, then, is it called the
> "Strategy-Free" criterion? It is called that because the strategy
> doesn't require any reversal of true preferences. But it *does* involve
> insincere truncation strategy
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Not at all. Russ just stated the criterion, and it didn't say that the  
> members of that majority could keep Y from winning if that majority 
> truncated. It said that if no one falsifies a preference, and if the 
> majority who prefer the CW to Y vote sincerely, then Y won't win, with a 
> complying method. The CW>Y voters needn't do other than rank sincerely. 
> That's why it's called the Strategy-Free criterion.

Actually, Mike is right about that. I just re-read the criterion, and it 
doesn't involve truncation by the majority. I guess that justifies the 
insults, eh?

Maybe Mike will wake up some day and realize that he started the 
insults, and he perpetuates them. I will be happy to stop insulting Mike 
as soon as he stops insulting me and learns how to disagree 
respectfully. Until that time (or until I get off this email list), I 
will continue to expose him as the pedantic amateur he is. He badly 
needs to learn a lesson about professionalism even if he is an amateur.

> Russ continues:
> 
> , which the criterion itself does not
> state. So the criterion name itself is misleading.
> 
> I replyi:
> 
> Russ has mislead himself by being unable to read what he's just copied.

Another insult.