[EM] Markus reply
Russ Paielli
6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Sun Feb 27 17:09:25 PST 2005
Markus Schulze markus.schulze-at-alumni.tu-berlin.de |EMlist| wrote:
> Dear Russ,
>
> I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
>
>>I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC)
>>and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
>>
>>"X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers
>>candidate X to candidate Y.
>>
>>SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual
>>rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A
>>is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected
>>with zero probability.
>
>
> You wrote (27 Feb 2005):
>
>>In your interpretation of SFC above, I think your supposition 2
>>should actually be part of the result. Here is my attempt at it:
>>
>>SFC: Suppose A >> B. Then partial individual rankings can be
>>completed in such a manner that no preferences are reversed
>>and candidate B must be elected with zero probability.
>
>
> Well, it seems to me that your interpretation does't work when
> there is a circular tie with A >> B, B >> C, and C >> A.
>
> Example:
>
> 40 BCA
> 35 CAB
> 25 ABC
>
> Markus Schulze
Before Mike has a conniption, I should probably say that I misstated his
SFC criterion. SFC stipulates that A is the "sincere" Condorcet winner.
The exact definition or correctness of SFC was not my point, however.
--Russ
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