[EM] Markus reply

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Russ,

I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
> I interpret Mike Ossipoff's "Strategy-Free Criterion" (SFC)
> and "Generalized Strategy-Free Criterion" (GSFC) as follows:
>
> "X >> Y" means that a majority of the voters strictly prefers
> candidate X to candidate Y.
>
> SFC: Suppose (1) A >> B and (2) the partial individual
> rankings can be completed in such a manner that candidate A
> is a Condorcet candidate. Then candidate B must be elected
> with zero probability.

You wrote (27 Feb 2005):
> In your interpretation of SFC above, I think your supposition 2
> should actually be part of the result. Here is my attempt at it:
>
> SFC: Suppose A >> B. Then partial individual rankings can be
> completed in such a manner that no preferences are reversed
> and candidate B must be elected with zero probability.

Well, it seems to me that your interpretation does't work when
there is a circular tie with A >> B, B >> C, and C >> A.

Example:

   40 BCA
   35 CAB
   25 ABC

Markus Schulze