[EM] Re: Condorcet package-wvx

[Dave Ketchum]

On Fri, 25 Feb 2005 13:14:00 -0800 Ted Stern wrote:

> More comments on Dave's proposal for single winner elections:
> 
> On 23 Feb 2005 at 01:00 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
>>Trying to define a complete Condorcet based election method:
>>
> 
> <...justification...>
> 
>>How vote?  I suggest one list of candidates, with room beside each for 
>>ranking.  Ranks read as 1 (top) to 9, with indecipherable ranked below 9 
>>(CAN happen with paper ballots such as absentee; should be impossible with 
>>electronic voting machine).  Blanks are lower as not voted:
>>     A number repeated gives all with that number the same rank.
>>     Skipping numbers does not disturb order of used numbers.
>>     1-9, indecipherable, and blank, is 11 choices - more than likely 
>>useful with even 99 candidates, but anyone seeing a problem here go solve
>>it.
>>
> 
> One more comment here.  Nine choices is a lot!  Some voters have problems with
> even one -- they circle the blanks on an optical scan ballot, or mark the
> blank with an X.


Nine is convenient to permit.  Note that we should expect many voters to 
be happy with, and do, only one.  Go back and look, and see that I will be 
happy with an X - even a couple Xes, which would be ties above the blanks 
that count as ignored.

> 
> If you want more than 3 choices, five or six would be within their grasp.  I
> like the idea of illegible and blank, adding 2 extra choices.
> 
> I would add this extra feature, default approval cutoff.


I am not doing approval.  They can leave blank all they do not approve of.

> 
> Any ranked candidates above indecipherable would be considered approved,
> unless a higher approval cutoff were entered.


I consider indecipherable as approved - seems reasonable for paper 
absentee ballots.

> 
> 
>>	Truncation PERMITTED: As an extreme, a voter happy with Plurality's
>>service should be permitted to vote for one preferred candidate, and be 
>>done with it.  We are also supporting the voter who had pains with 
>>Plurality spoilers and NEEDS to rank multiple candidates.
>>     Write-ins permitted:  Must be, though each voter may be restricted 
>>to a single written per candidate list.
>>
>>Counting votes:
>>     (wv) seems the appropriate choice.  If two voters rank a pair of 
>>candidates (a=b) as equal, then (a>b) and (b>a) should each get one count.
>>
> 
> This is not standard tallying of ranked ballots for Condorcet.  It creates
> votes.  I maintain it won't pass the constitutional test.  A Condorcet
> completion method using this pairwise tally is not using (wv), it is using
> something else, now called "wvx".
> 
> If you split the vote between candidates, you are at least not creating votes,
> and could pass a constitutional test.  Maybe call a completion method using
> that ranking winning votes, split equal rank (wvs).  But it is still not wv.
> 

I am calling it wvx while we debate its usefulness.  BTW, wv seems unsure 
as to what to do with =.

Looks like I misused wv above - I was distinguishing between wv and 
margins for use in wvx.

> 
>>     The Condorcet array for each precinct, the whole district, and any 
>>meaningful subset of the district, should be public.
>>     Cycles CAN happen, and should be recognized as near ties.  How to 
>>resolve cycles must be solved before system is ready for voting.
>>     Write-ins counted:  Yes, as if one more candidate - each of which 
>>can be voted for by more than one voter (could demand advance notice but, 
>>right now, no notice makes sense to me).
>>
> 
> While I think the basic idea is reasonable, you need to commit to some kind of
> cycle resolution.  So what shall it be?  Ranked Pairs, BeatPath or River?  Or
> something else?


I am deliberately leaving out how to do cycle resolution, though some 
possibilities would let us forget counting =.  Time for that after the basics.

> 
> Before you decide, consider how you would handle the following cases.  This
> could easily happen within a short time after adoption of Condorcet.  Think of
> A as "Green", B as "Democratic", C as "Republican".


Elsewhere I have discussed ballot layout.  If you see need for ">>" please 
tell me how to squeeze it into a paper ballot, and how to explain it to 
voters - including what great value it has.

> 
>        Sincere preference
>        35: A>B>>C
>        25: B>A>>C
>        40: C>>A>B
> 
>        (1) B defects, buries A
>        35: A>B>>C
>        25: B>>C>A
>        40: C>>A>B
> 
>        (2) C truncates, B defects, buries A
>        35: A>B>>C
>        25: B>>C>A
>        40: C>>A=B
> 
>        (3) C truncates, B truncates
>        35: A>B>>C
>        25: B>>A=C
>        40: C>>A=B
> 
>        (4) A changes approval cutoff as a poison pill for B
>        35: A>>B>C
>        25: B>>A=C
>        40: C>>A=B
> 
>        (5) B and A change approval cutoff but retain sincere preference
>            ordering.
>        35: A>>B>C
>        25: B>>A>C
>        40: C>>A=B
> 
> Now consider Jobst Heitzig's Grand Compromise Proposal last fall, which is
> similar to yours.
> 
>   http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-October/014024.html


Thanks, though I do not have time tonight.

> 
> And recall that James Green-Armytage proposed a similar ranking, Approval
> Weighted Pairwise, last June.


If this is a variation of approval, then I stay with Condorcet.

> 
>   http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-June/013241.html
> 
> Ted
> 


-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.