[EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?

[Steve Eppley]

Hi,
Paul K wrote:
> I merely observe from the original ballots that 5 of 9 
> voters prefer C over A. So those are the ones who will 
> be unhappy if A is elected.

It's a stretch to call them "unhappy" since all we know 
is that they ranked C over A.  Perhaps they'll be much much 
happier if any of these three candidates are elected 
than they'd be if some other candidate D had been elected, 
as some other voting method (e.g., plurality rule) might 
do. (Remember, the decisions by candidates and potential 
candidates whether to run and what policies to advocate 
are influenced by the voting method.)

> That majority will initiate a referendum that changes 
> the voting method because it selected the "wrong"
> candidate from the VOTERS' perspective.

What method does Paul think they will change to?
What method would have elected C?  :-)

The point of satisfying the Immunity from Majority 
Complaints criterion is so that no majority will 
initiate a referendum to change the winner or 
the voting method.

It's easy to rebut that majority's argument that C 
should have been elected, if the method is immune 
from majority complaints, by turning their own 
"majority rule" argument against them.  Maybe 
the rebuttal won't deter all of the majority-- 
they might include Paul :-) --but hopefully 
enough of them will be sensible.

Suppose that majority proceeded instead with a referendum
that changed the outcome to C.  Why then wouldn't a 7/9 
majority then believe C is the wrong winner from the 
VOTERS' perspective and launch a referendum of their own?  
And then, after the second referendum changes the outcome 
to B, why wouldn't a 6/9 majority then believe B is the 
wrong winner from the VOTERS' perspective and launch a 
referendum to restore A? (I'm using the term "VOTERS' 
perspective" with some sarcasm, since I don't know
what Paul meant by it.)

Besides having to cope with such a rebuttal, the 5/9 
would have only a weak incentive to replace A with C 
assuming all three candidates are centrists, which is 
a reasonable assumption since the method favors centrists 
and candidates will know that and become centrists if
they want careers in politics.  Some other methods,
such as plurality rule and IRV, promote polarization
and 2 big parties each nominating only one candidate, 
instead of centrism.

> You academics can say A is right, but if that is so, 
> this just demonstrates that Plurality does as well 
> as anything.

But only in some examples, like this one.  Not in 
other examples.  And not when we consider the overall 
incentives induced by the methods.

I didn't realize I'm an academic.  I'd thought I was 
merely a dilettante.

--Steve