[EM] Re: Condorcet package
Rob LeGrand
honky1998 at yahoo.com
Thu Feb 24 15:27:27 PST 2005
Ted wrote:
> As Kevin has pointed out, by counting a=b as a>b + b>a, winning
> votes (wv) acquires some characteristics of relative margins
> (rm). With your tabulation rule, the margin doesn't change, but
> the winning vote totals do.
Counting A=B as 1/2 A>B + 1/2 B>A is equivalent to using margins.
I take this approach at my ranked-ballot voting site without going
into the matter. (On the descriptions page I write, "tied ranks
are counted as half-votes for each side".) I do it this way
because I prefer margins but don't see the debate as important and
don't want to emphasize it. Briefly, I prefer margins over
winning-votes for the following reasons.
1. Zero-info strategy is fully-ranked sincerity under margins, but
usually not under winning-votes. (It's often to a voter's
advantage to vote many tied ranks near the top.)
2. Margins is more intuitive and easier to explain to most people.
3. I haven't seen that winning-votes truly offers any valuable
strategic guarantees over margins.
=====
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/
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