[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Abd ulRahman Lomax]

At 01:17 PM 8/11/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>Regarding the example:  59 people out of 100 prefer B to A.  Under the
>principle of "one person, one vote", it's extremely difficult to argue
>that A should win.

"Should" is undefined.

Giving it a definition, that candidate should win who will best unify the 
society electing him or her. This, of course, is only one possible definition.

However, using it, suppose that, yes, 59/100 voters prefer B to A. But the 
preference is slight, and those voters, voting Approval "sincerely" (which 
is also not clearly defined), might easily approve both B and A. Yes, they 
prefer B. Maybe B is taller, or B is blonde, and gentlemen prefer blondes....

And suppose that 41 voters out of 100 so detest B that a serious insurgency 
will start if B is elected.

Would you still think that B "should" win?

My point is that context matters. I don't find it difficult at all to argue 
that simple expressed preference (which is all that Condorcet considers) is 
a primitive criterion and is not always a suitable one.

I do agree that Range Voting has some possible problems with strategic 
voting; it is really the same problem as with Approval. What is unclear, 
however, is the actual effect that this would have in real elections.