[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Warren Smith]

> If [the Condorcet winner criterion] means (2a) "if we redid the same
> election but using a DIFFERENT election system, namely majority vote,
> and demanding votes `logically consistent' with the originally-cast
> votes, then A would win"

This is what it means.  I'm quite confident that the literature will
back me up on this.

--dear Rob.  Let me know if you ever find a single instance, in any literature
whatsoever, of the condorcet criterion being used to consider a class of voting
methods in which the votes are more geenral than ranked-preference-order ballots
(and than partial-orders) i.e. in which it is not possible to derive those votes from their
ranked-abbreviations.

I have never encountered any such example in the literature.

Therefore, I am creating my own literature.

because it is necessary to now do so.
I repeat, the condorcet criterion, and many other criteria EM often discuss, are
naturally uniquely defined only for ranked-ballot type voting
methods.  I do not think there should be (nor is) any dispute on that.
When those criteria are applied to more general kinds of votign methods, often
you need to think more and define more and reconsider the definitions, etc etc.