[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed
Rob Lanphier
robla at robla.net
Thu Aug 11 00:20:43 PDT 2005
Hi Warren,
I'm interested in Range Voting, since it appears to be popular among
many electoral reform advocates here. However, being a Condorcet
partisan myself, I'm having a hard time getting through the Range v.
Condorcet page here:
>From the site:
> A "Condorcet method" is any voting method that obeys the "Condorcet
> property" that it always elects a "beats-all-winner" if one exists. A
> "beats-all-winner" is a candidate who would beat every other candidate
> in the two-choice head-to-head election got be erasing every other
> candidate from all votes.
>
> Well, according to that definition, Range Voting is a Condorcet
> method, since if you erase all candidates and all numerical votes for
> them in all range votes - except for two candidates A and B - then A
> will beat B in the resulting 2-choice election if and only if he beat
> B in the original election. Because erasing the votes for the others
> has no effect on A and B's individual totals.
Here's a counterexample:
41 ballots:
A:10
B:3
C:0
(Ranked equiv: A>B>C)
10 ballots:
A:5
B:10
C:0
(Ranked equiv: B>A>C)
10 ballots:
A:0
B:10
C:5
(Ranked equiv: B>C>A)
39 ballots:
A:0
B:3
C:10
(Ranked equiv: C>B>A)
Range Voting result:
A:460
B:440
C:440
Condorcet winner: B
B beats A: 59-41
B beats C: 61-39
A beats C: 61-39
Running the "erase the candidate" filter over this election doesn't
change the fact that A beats B in a Range election, even though B is the
Condorcet winner by a clear margin.
Rob
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