[EM] More on tactics of adoption/range V condorcet & approval/ why unify behind range

[Warren Smith]

In fact let me elaborate.  Although my critics claim it
is not clear I have really shown Condorcet methods must lead
to 2-party domination (I think it is clear, except I admit
that the winning-votes + equalities-permitted enhancements of condorcet
seem to permit Condorcet to perhaps escape from such domination)
I think they and everybody SHOULD at least WORRY that it will.

The trouble with complicated-to-analyse systems like advanced condorcet methods,
is it is very hard to be sure of essential questions like this.
Quite possibly this question cannot be convincingly answered in
any manner short of trying it in several countries for 80 years.  A huge
computer sim of "people" and "parties" could try, but any such
simulation obviously will be attackable and unconvincing.

So.  Given this, suppose you are a USA third party.  (Assume optimistically
that such a party actually has a brain.)  Do you want to push
Condorcet methods?  If they lead to 2-party domination, then hell no.
If not, maybe yes.  So it is a gamble with your life.
Do you want to push IRV?  Definitely not: definitely leads
to 2-party domination (3 countries, 60-90 years each).  Plurality?  Hell no.
Do you want to push range?  Yes - experiments I already did with real voters
indicate it clearly will help your party hugely (and far more so than approval voting).

So that is why we have to unify behind range: tactically, we need the troops the
third parties can supply.  If those third parties' leadership is
brought into contact with the data, they will agree to enodrse range.  The problem
is merely to force that...  This is not the only ingredient of my tactical plan
(I also want to co-opt the major parties...) but it seems an essential ingredient.

Another ingredient of the tactical plan is the Iowa 08 caucuses.  I predict
these caucuses will involve a comparatively large fraction of honest voters
and a fairly large # of candidates (10).  That is precisely
the regime where range exhibits a large quality advantage over approval voting.
So again, tactically, pushing range, and not approval, is the right move.

Now suppose you are a fire-breathing Condorcet advocate who is pretty confident
it is a better system than range.  I STILL claim you should support range,
because I believe the best tactic for you to try to get the world to adopt
condorcet, is first to "get them in the mood" by adopting range, then they'll
be more willing to accept condorcet at that future point.  Right now,
I am confident is no hope of that happening in just 1 stage because of my
polling experience...


wds