[EM] range voting strat, reply to Gorr

[Warren Smith]

> WDS: Specifically, it is NOT possible to determine your strategically-optimal range vote
> working without any information about what the other voters are doing.

>Eric Gorr:
Yes, it is.

Simply decide who you wouldn't mind seeing as the winner and give them 
the highest possible ranking. Everyone else, give them the lowest 
possible ranking. No information about what other voters are doing is 
needed.

REPLY BY WARREN SMITH:
I was right and you are wrong.  Here is 
a counterexample.   Let the other voters create a tie for first among A and B,
*or* a tie among B and C, you do not know which.
If the former (and your preference is A>B>C) then your best range vote is
A=max, B=C=min.
If the latter, then your best range vote is
A=B=max, C=min.

Gorr's method is at least 50% worse than my method, and possibly 100% worse.

The fact that at least two people on the EM list are capable of not understanding this, perhaps
explains why it is, that so many real world voters experimentally are non-strategic.
It also suggests that in a system where undertanading best strategy really *is*
difficult (e.g. IRV, sophisticated Condorcet) that god only knows what real world 
voters are going to do, but for sure, adopting the best strategy always, is not going
to be it.

wds