[EM] range voting strat, reply to Gorr

[Eric Gorr]

Warren Smith wrote:
>>WDS: Specifically, it is NOT possible to determine your strategically-optimal range vote
>>working without any information about what the other voters are doing.
> 
> 
>>Eric Gorr:
> 
> Yes, it is.
> 
> Simply decide who you wouldn't mind seeing as the winner and give them 
> the highest possible ranking. Everyone else, give them the lowest 
> possible ranking. No information about what other voters are doing is 
> needed.
> 
> REPLY BY WARREN SMITH:
> I was right and you are wrong.  

No, you are not.

> Here is 
> a counterexample.   Let the other voters create a tie for first among A and B,
> *or* a tie among B and C, you do not know which.
> If the former (and your preference is A>B>C) then your best range vote is
> A=max, B=C=min.
> If the latter, then your best range vote is
> A=B=max, C=min.

This is not a valid counter-example.  You have not stated whether or not 
I would mind seeing B win or whether or if my primary goal is to make 
sure C looses.

The point is that once I can clearly determine my desire for the 
election, I can easily maximize my voting power, without knowing what 
the other voters are doing, by ranking only at the extremes and this 
will give me a strategic advantage over every other voter.

> The fact that at least two people on the EM list are capable of not understanding this, perhaps
> explains why it is, that so many real world voters experimentally are non-strategic.

The fact that you now resorting to insults to support your opinions is 
clearly demonstrating that people should no longer pay any attention to 
anything you have to say.

As such, this is my final response to you.




-- 
== Eric Gorr =============================== http://www.ericgorr.net ===
"The more you study, the more you know. The more you know, the more you
forget. The more you forget, the less you know. So, why study?" - ???
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===