[EM] Sincere methods

[Juho Laatu]

On Apr 4, 2005, at 23:32, Eric Gorr wrote:

> one cannot assume that just a single population will vote 
> strategically to obtain the best outcome from their point of view.

> once one population begins strategically voting, others will do so as 
> well and I have yet to see a compelling argument that it would lead to 
> anything other then chaotic results in general - which is, perhaps, 
> among the best motivations to vote sincerely.

Agreed. Strategic voting can lead to chaos and often also to worse 
results than if voters would have voted sincerely.

Any good ideas of methods that could be used to estimate whether 
certain strategic voting tactic is likely to bring more harm than 
benefits to the voter (and in general)? One simple method would be to 
simulate elections. Voter preferences would not be fixed but would vary 
within assumed (forecast accuracy) range. Other voters could apply the 
same or other strategies depending on their situation. On could measure 
e.g. the situation where one group tries to agree about some strategy.

This kind of information could be used to prove some strategic voting 
patterns non-threatening (assuming that they are used by rational 
voters).

And as Eric wrote, chaos could be a reason not to vote strategically. 
This could be true even if some strategies would statistically improve 
the outcome.

Best Regards,
Juho