[EM] Sincere methods

[Eric Gorr]

Juho Laatu wrote:

>     Ex. 1: Sincere preferences:
> 46: A>B>C
> 44: B>A>C
> 5: C>A>B
> 5: C>B>A
>     Ex. 1: Pairwise comparisons:
> A>B 51-49
> A>C 90-10
> B>C 90-10
> 
> And the B voters then voted strategically 44: B>C>A and as a result B  
> won the election.

But, since the C voters who also ranked A above B, know they don't have 
a good chance to win the election, decide to vote strategically in order 
to get the best result for themselves and change their votes to A>C>B, 
which results in A winning the election again.

I think this shows a fundamental problem with this class of 
examples...one cannot assume that just a single population will vote 
strategically to obtain the best outcome from their point of view.

But, of course, once one population begins strategically voting, others 
will do so as well and I have yet to see a compelling argument that it 
would lead to anything other then chaotic results in general - which is, 
perhaps, among the best motivations to vote sincerely.