[EM] Democratic Fair Choice and the set P
Jobst Heitzig
heitzig-j at web.de
Thu Apr 7 14:54:37 PDT 2005
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> I suggest picking the winning alternative by random ballot from BP,
> rather than from P when there is serious potential for something like
> the
>
> 49 C
> 24 B (sincere B>A)
> 27 A>B
>
> scenario.
I guess you assume that all ranked candidates are approved, right? If
so, sincere votes will give DMC:A and DFC:A or B, while strategic votes
will give DMC,DFC:B. However, the A voters have a simple
counter-strategy which does not even require them to change their
ranking: they only have to vote A>>B instead of A>B, which would give
DMC:C and DFC:B or C, which is worse than the original result for the B
voters. So perhaps we could live without the extra complication of
determining beatpaths...
Jobst
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