[EM] Democratic Fair Choice and the set P

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Thu Apr 7 14:54:37 PDT 2005


Dear Forest!

You wrote:

> I suggest picking the winning alternative by random ballot from BP,
> rather than from P when there is serious potential for something like
> the
> 
> 49 C 
> 24 B     (sincere B>A)
> 27 A>B
> 
> scenario.

I guess you assume that all ranked candidates are approved, right? If
so, sincere votes will give DMC:A and DFC:A or B, while strategic votes
will give DMC,DFC:B. However, the A voters have a simple
counter-strategy which does not even require them to change their
ranking: they only have to vote A>>B instead of A>B, which would give
DMC:C and DFC:B or C, which is worse than the original result for the B
voters. So perhaps we could live without the extra complication of
determining beatpaths...

Jobst




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