[EM] Kevin, co-operation/defection game of chicken. SDSC.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Kevin--

You said that ATLO threateners might not have the upper hand in the 
co-operation/defection game of chicken in wv. I claim that they will, 
because:

In the game of chicken, morality and ethics affect power.

The animal kingdom provides plenty of evidence of that. The cat or dog who 
has legitmately acquired some meat and is in possession of it, vs one that 
wants to take the meat. The cat who is defending its own yard against an 
intruder. They have the upper hand.

Both the  B voters and C voters could simultaneously apply ATLO. Then both, 
in the event of being CW, are protected from defection by the other side. 
Both sides will then co-operate. Both using ATLO is the obvious, natural and 
stable solution. The defection problem is completely eliminated.

Before the election, the C voters can say "As a matter of principle, we'll 
give you A if you defect and try to steal the election from the CW." What 
can the B voters say? This?: "As a matter of principle, we'll give you A, if 
you try to stop us from stealing the election from the CW." That doesn't 
sound as convincing or as powerful.

You said:

But it takes a Condorcet-centric perspective to say that the B voters are
"getting away with something." I doubt B voters will appreciate this 
perspective
if it seems that their choices are to 1) give the election away or 2) "get 
away
with something."

I reply:

The question is whether the B voters will expect to be able to get away with 
it, if the C voters announce that they're going to use ATLO.

You continued:

If you insist on electing the CW, then I agree that you have no choice but 
to
elect somebody awful when the B voters defect.

I reply:

The hope is that, for that reason, the B voters won't defect.

I too  think that SDSC is more important than the Condorcet critrerion.

SDSC may be especially important, necessary,  if, in Approval,  progressives 
never have the courage to stop giving a vote to the Democrat. Our scenarios 
say that when Nader outpolls Bush, the progressives will realize that they 
no longer need to vote for some "lesser" evil Democrat. But what if that 
turns out to not be so, when the corruption-owned editorials keep telling 
progressives to not risk electing the Republican?

CR seems so much easier to propose and enact, as compared to the good rank 
methods, that it's worth a try first. But if it turns out that voters are 
unable to stop voting for Democrats, even when Nader outpolls the Republican 
in Approval, then it's time to try for a method that meets SDSC and SFC.

That's interesting about SK meeting LNH, as well as WDSC and SFC. I didn't 
know that, and it makes SK a good rival to PC. But I don't know which would 
be better understood and accepted by the public. Of course my familiarity 
with PC could bias my judgement about which would seem more plausible and 
natural to the public. If SK were more plausible for the public, that would 
further strengthen SK in comparison to PC.

Mike Ossipoff

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