[EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?

[Eric Gorr]

At 3:12 PM -0700 10/6/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
>On Oct 6, 2004, at 2:58 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>>But, to use the terminology and techniques y'all do, let's examine the
>>BALLOTS that result if B is not a candidate:
>>
>>4: A>C
>>5: C>A
>>
>>Adding B to the mix causes A to be elected, even though all voters who
>>prefer B over anybody voted A third of the 3.
>
>Okay, I think that's what most people here call the 'spoiler' effect.
>I don't remember the original example, but it sounds like yes, 
>that's a problem.

It's more accurately termed a failure Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), which no ranked ballot method can satisfy. Both B 
& C are irrelevant alternatives for MAM since neither won using MAM.

So, based on Paul's comments, Paul will reject all ranked ballot 
methods if he expects them to satisfy IIA.