[EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?

[Paul Kislanko]

Paul didn't reject anything.  

> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com 
> [mailto:election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
> ] On Behalf Of Eric Gorr
> Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2004 5:26 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?
> 
> At 3:12 PM -0700 10/6/04, Dr. Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
> >On Oct 6, 2004, at 2:58 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> >>But, to use the terminology and techniques y'all do, let's 
> examine the 
> >>BALLOTS that result if B is not a candidate:
> >>
> >>4: A>C
> >>5: C>A
> >>
> >>Adding B to the mix causes A to be elected, even though all 
> voters who 
> >>prefer B over anybody voted A third of the 3.
> >
> >Okay, I think that's what most people here call the 'spoiler' effect.
> >I don't remember the original example, but it sounds like 
> yes, that's a 
> >problem.
> 
> It's more accurately termed a failure Independence of 
> Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which no ranked ballot method 
> can satisfy. Both B & C are irrelevant alternatives for MAM 
> since neither won using MAM.
> 
> So, based on Paul's comments, Paul will reject all ranked 
> ballot methods if he expects them to satisfy IIA.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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