[EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?
Brian Olson
bql at bolson.org
Wed May 19 10:14:01 PDT 2004
The controversial example:
49 A>C>B
48 B>C>A
3 C>B>A
Two ways of putting voter's internal preferences behind that (Both sets
of ratings exhibit the above rankings):
*{number of voters} {A's rating}, {B's rating}, {C's rating}:
*49 .03,.01,.02
*48 .01,.03,.02
*3 .01,.02,.03
IRV = B; all others = C
The above example presents a population with very weak differences in
degree of preference between the choices. I believe that a situation
like this is implicitly part of the social assumptions that Condorcet
backers make. Voters would be happy to get their second choice because
there isn't that much of a difference between that and their first
choice. The compromise choice is obviously the right way to go.
*49 1,.01,.1
*48 .01,1,.1
*3 .01,.1,1
IRNR, IRV = B; Condorcet, Borda = C; Raw Cardinal Ratings = A
This example electorate has very strong preferences for a primary
choice over a secondary, and for the secondary over the tertiary. I
believe this is the model assumed by IRV backers.
Under this set of ratings, IRNR emulates IRV, while under the first
ratings it had the same solution as Condorcet. The IRV process
disqualifies C in the first round, those votes then go to B which wins
in the second round.
Raw CR given ratings like this chose the plurality winner. Whodathunkit?
So, under the first set of ratings, IRV is clearly an aberration. The
compromise choice found by every other method is the right thing to do.
Under the second set of ratings, it's not so clear. Depending on the
system, all three results are possible. Which one is the most just? The
straight utilitarian answer goes with Raw CR and Plurality! Condorcet
and Borda disregard the strength of people's desires. IRV is vulnerable
to nasty singularities, is this one of them? IRNR is my pet, why should
any of you like it?
Breakfast for thought, good day. :-)
(results calculated with http://bolson.org/voting/vote_form.html )
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
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