[EM] IRV's "majority winner". What if we let the people choose?

[Dave Ketchum]

THANK You Ken!

I will look at the 48/49/3 example for ammunition, with these platforms 
(here C deserves more votes - my main desire was that A and B each have 
serious backers and enemies):
       49  A<C<B - Make age of consent 35, with stronger penalties (should
reduce population growth, overpopulation becoming a serious problem).
       48  B<C<A - Reduce age of consent to zero (misuse of this too often
punishes those who have done no actual harm to willing mature teens).
       3  C<B<A - No change to sexual control laws without more mature
thought as to logic and acceptability.

On Mon, 17 May 2004 07:54:32 -0400 Ken Taylor wrote:

 > Sorry, but this inspired my sleep deprived brain. Has anyone noticed that
 > many of the discussions on this list follow a familiar pattern? To wit:
 >
 > Anti-IRVer: Here is an example that proves that IRV does not select the 
same
 > answer as Condorcet, therefore it is highly inferior to Condorcet, which
 > *does* select the same answer as Condorcet!

As a Condorcet backer, I have to use available ammunition to make this one
stronger.  MORE voters will be pleased if C is elected than if B is
elected; likewise electing C will please MORE than electing A would.

While the A and B backers can be disappointed at not winning, they should
accept not losing to their worst enemies even though few made C a first
choice.

EASY to pick examples in which IRV's weaknesses are more obvious.  Seems 
to me the REAL answer to James Gilmour is to educate the nonbelievers.

Cycles make a lot of noise.  While methods of resolving these need careful
thought, they are best thought of as near ties - walk one way around the
cycle and your starting point reads as weak; walk the other way and it
reads as strong.

Worth remembering that IRV and Condorcet use identical ballots and usually
assign identical winners - often the same winners as Plurality would.
heir excuse for existing is that Plurality does not reasonably let voters
express their desires when faced with multiple serious candidates

 > Pro-IRVer: No, you've got it wrong! We're not really sure, exactly, *what*
 > IRV picks, but we're darned sure that whatever it picks is better than
 > Condorcet!

See above.

 > Approvaler: Will you two stop bickering and see the light? Not only does
 > approval voting pick the exact correct answer in every situation, but it
 > also will do all your household chores for you, and it cures cancer!

This example demonstrates an Approval weakness - easy enough to approve
Best and not approve worst.  C is trouble, for it is dangerous to vote
C acceptable and thus perhaps cause C to beat Best, or to vote C as 
unacceptable and thus risk C losing to Worst.
 >
 > Just meant to be humorous. Hope I didn't offend :)
 >
 > Ken
--------------------------------------

Some dream that perfect knowledge would inspire different voting under 
IRV.  I do not see that, for A and B are each so close to winning that 
their backers cannot afford to change, while C is so weak in firstplace 
votes that there is no reason to vote away from their desires.
-- 
   davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
             Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                   If you want peace, work for justice.