[EM] Stepwise AERLO option
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue May 11 20:28:01 PDT 2004
Stepwise AERLO (SA) option:
If any voters choose this option, then repeated AERLO trials are done. Each
AERLO trial consists of two counts, an initial count and a final (promotion)
count. In the 1st AERLO trial, each voter's AERLO line is where s/he put it.
In each subsequent AERLO application, the AERLO line of each voter who chose
the SA option is moved one candidate down his/her ranking, unless someone
above his/her AERLO line already has won. And a voter's AERLO line is never
moved to below a candidate who has already won. If someone who has chosen
the SA option doesn't mark an AERLO line, its position is assumed to be
under hir favorite.
The repetition of the AERLO trials stops when every voter's ranking stops
moving its AERLO line downward, for one of the reasons specified in the
paragraph before this one. The current winner at that time then becomes the
final winner.
[end of SA definition]
SA(PC) uses SA with PC:
In my usual 40,25,35 example, this completely gets rid of the need for
defensive strategy, even when order-reversal is tried:
Sincere rankings:
40: AB
25: BA
35: CB
The A voters use offensive order-reversal:
40: AB
25: BA
35: CB
A wins.
But say the B & C voters have chosen the SA option:
In the 1st AERLO trial, the B & C voters automatically have an AERLO line
placed under their favorite.
So, in the 1st AERLO trial, A wins in the 1st count and also in the 2nd
count.
Then the C voters' ranking moves its AERLO line down one candidate, to below
B. The B voters don't move their AERLO line down, since that would be moving
it to below someone who has already won.
Now, in the 2nd AERLO trial, A again wins in the 1st count. But in the 2nd
count, the C voters' ranking promotes B to 1st place, and B wins.
No rankings will move their AERLO line any lower, for the reasons specified
in SA's definition, and so B is the final winner.
Of course it doesn't work so perfectly when there are more than 3
candidates. Then, the B voters could move their AERLO line to below a 4th
candidate, a nonwinner who could win instead of CW B.
It's then similar to Bucklin, except that Bucklin always has that situation,
and it only happens here if there's offensive order-reversal. And it's also
like the fact that in wv, when defensive truncation is considered, it's the
B voters who must protect B. The difference is that now when they do so, by
not using the SA option, it elects B instead of C, as it would in defensive
truncation in ordinary wv.
Also, maybe the SA(wv) &/or SA(ERBucklin) strategy situation could be
improved some by having some added provisiion to try to prevent the SA
option from going into action for rankings that are going to benefit later
from SA. I realize that that would be imperfect and would lead to
complications, which could be dealt with. How much benefit it could bring, I
don't know.
It would be nice if something like SA, with suitable improvements, could
make it possible for a majority to always protect a CW's win without using
any strategy at all. Or to always be able to keep the win in the sincere
Smith set without using any strategy at all.
That doesn't violate Gibbard-Satterthwaite, it seems to me, because
Gibbard-Satterthwaite merely says that every method should be able to have
_some_ kind of stratgegy incentive, under _some_ special conditions, not
that a majorilty should need strategy to protect a CW.
So the question of how good a method can be is still open, unless someone
can prove that it's impossible for a method to guarantee that a majority can
always protect the win of a CW while voting sincerely.
I'm not saying that SA can guarantee that, even with the help of
complicating rules. But that goal was my reason for checking out SA. Can
anyone find a method that guarantees that a majority can protect a CW's win,
or at least prevent a particular candidate from stealing that win, without
doing other than voting sincerely? SFC-complying methods guarantee that
under SFC's reasonable premise conditions. Can any method guarantee that
unconditionally? Can anyone prove that there's no such method?
Mike Ossipoff
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